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Alice communicates with words drawn uniformly amongst {|j〉}j=1..n , the canonical orthonormal
basis. Sometimes however Alice interleaves quantum decoys { |j〉+i|k〉√
2
} between her messages. Such
pairwise superpositions of possible words cannot be distinguished from the message words. Thus as
malevolent Eve observes the quantum channel, she runs the risk of damaging the superpositions (by
causing a collapse). At the receiving end honest Bob, whom we assume is warned of the quantum
decoys’ distribution, checks upon their integrity with a measurement. The present work establishes,
in the case of individual attacks, the tradeoff between Eve’s information gain (her chances, if a
message word was sent, of guessing which) and the disturbance she induces (Bob’s chances, if a
quantum decoy was sent, to detect tampering). Whilst not directly applicable to secure channel
protocols, quantum decoys seem a powerful primitive for constructing other n-dimensional quantum
cryptographic applications. Moreover the methods employed in this article should be of strong
interest to anyone concerned with the old but fundamental problem of how much information may
be gained about a system, versus how much this will disturb the system, in quantum mechanics.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
Keywords: d-level systems cryptography
I. MOTIVATION AND CLAIM
The key principle of quantum cryptography could be
summarized as follows. Honest parties play using quan-
tum states. To the eavesdropper these states are ran-
dom and non-orthogonal. In order to gather informa-
tion she must measure them, but this may cause irre-
versible damage. Honest parties seek to detect her mis-
chief by checking whether certain quantum states are left
intact. The tradeoff between the eavesdropper’s informa-
tion gain (about an ensemble of quantum states), and the
disturbance she necessarily induces (upon this ensemble),
can thus be viewed as the power engine behind quantum
cryptographic protocols.
Yet while numerous protocol-specific proofs of security
have been given, Information Gain versus Disturbance
tradeoffs themselves have remained stubbornly difficult
to quantify. The problem was first taken over by Fuchs
and Peres[11], who tackled the seemingly simple case
of the two non-orthogonal equiprobable states ensemble
{(1/2, |ψ0〉〈ψ0|), (1/2, |ψ1〉〈ψ1|)}. A geometrical deriva-
tion of their result can be found in [2]. For discrete dis-
tributions this is just about the only result available. Of
lesser interest for cryptography, but very important in
terms of its methods is the work by Banaszek[5], who
quantified the tradeoff for the continuous uniform n-
dimensional ensemble. Barnum[6] makes several accurate
qualitative remarks upon the same ensemble, suggesting
the tradeoff remains unchanged for a uniform distribu-
tion over mutually unbiased states.
In the present work we quantify the disturbance in-
∗Electronic address: pja35@cam.ac.uk
duced upon the uniform ensemble of n-dimensional states
{(1/n2, ρjk}, where j and k range from 1 to n, and ρjk
stands for the density matrix of pairwise superpositions
(|j〉+i|k〉)(〈j|−i〈k|)
2 (note that when j = k this is simply the
basis state |j〉〈j|). When making use of non-orthogonal
states this is no doubt a natural distribution to consider,
and thus an important building block for n-dimensional
cryptographic protocols. Its pi/2 phase renders this ‘pair-
ing ensemble’ undistinguishable from the canonical en-
semble {(1/n, |j〉〈j|)}, for they both have density ma-
trix Id/n (the maximally mixed state). This feature
enables the honest parties to hide the pairwise super-
positions within classical messages as means of securing
those, i.e. to use the superpositions as ‘quantum decoys’.
In such situations the eavesdropper seeks to gather in-
formation about the classical messages, not the decoys.
Therefore we quantify her information gain with respect
to the canonical ensemble {(1/n, |j〉〈j|)}, as suits the fol-
lowing scenario best:
Scenario 1 (Quantum decoys) Consider a quantum
channel for transmitting n-dimensional systems hav-
ing canonical orthonormal basis {|j〉}. Suppose Alice’s
message words are drawn from the canonical ensem-
ble {(1/n, |j〉〈j|)}j=1...n, whilst her quantum decoys are
drawn from the pairing ensemble {(1/n2, ρjk}j,k=1...n,
with ρjk =
(|j〉+i|k〉)(〈j|−i〈k|)
2 . Alice sends Bob, over the
quantum channel, either a message word or a decoy. Sup-
pose that Bob, whenever a quantum decoy ρjk gets sent,
measures
{Pintact =
( |j〉+ i|k〉√
2
)( 〈j| − i〈k|√
2
)
, Ptamper = I−Pintact}
(1)
so as to check for tampering. Suppose Eve is eavesdrop-
ping the quantum channel, and has an interest in deter-
2mining Alice’s message words.
Results on cryptographic protocols involving discrete dis-
tributions in n-dimensional quantum systems (where n is
left to vary), remain relatively scarce to this day [1],[7]-
[9],[13] and tend to focus on mutually unbiased states.
We hope our main result will prove a useful contribution
to this difficult line of research:
Claim 1 (Statement of security) Referring to Sce-
nario 1, suppose Eve performs an individual attack such
that, whenever a message word gets sent, she is able to
identify which with probability G (mean estimation fi-
delity).
Then, whenever a quantum decoy gets sent, the probabil-
ity D (induced disturbance) of Bob detecting the tamper-
ing is bounded below under the following tight inequality:
D ≥ 1
2
− 1
2n
(√
G+
√
(n− 1)(1 −G)
)2
(2)
For optimal attacks G varies from 1
n
to 1 as D varies
from 0 to 12− 12n .
The reminder of this paper is dedicated to proving the
above statement. The method is just as important as
the result, since it seems applicable to several similar
problems in quantum cryptography.
In section II we provide the necessary mathematical re-
sults required to prove Claim 1. We recall, in particular,
a key inequality regarding scalar products of vectors (first
obtained in [5]), as well as some powerful formulae arising
from the state-operator correspondence (first obtained in
[3]). Section III exploits the latter formula to express the
probability of Bob not detecting the tampering (induced
fidelity) as a linear functional upon the positive matrix
corresponding to Eve’s attack. This brings about crucial
simplifications, finally placing us in a position to apply
the inequality. We do so in Section IV, and prove our
claim.
II. MATHEMATICAL METHODS
Notations. We denote by Md(C) the set of d × d
matrices of complex numbers, and by Herm+d (C) its
subset of positive matrices, also referred to as the (non-
normalized) states of a d-dimensional quantum system.
In this section we let {|i〉} and {|j〉} be orthonormal
bases of Cm and Cn respectively, which we will refer to
as canonical.
The following result is a minor generalization of some
steps by Banaszek [5].
Proposition 1 (Inequality) Consider a vector of com-
plex numbers v = (ajr)jr together with a function j :
N −→ N. We then have:
f ≤ (√g +√(m− 1)(n− g))2
With
g =
∑
r
|aj(r)r|2
f =
∑
r
|
m−1∑
j=0
ajr |2
And subject to ||v||2 = n.
Proof. Further let
vj = (ajr)r ; vj(r) = (aj(r)r)r
v′j = (ajr)r with r such that j(r) 6= j
and notice that g = ||vj(r) ||2, f =
∑
ij vi.v
∗
j . The
Cauchy-Schwartz inequality yields:
vi.v
∗
j ≤ ||vi|| ||vj ||
f ≤ (
m−1∑
j=0
||vj ||)2
f ≤ (√g +
m−1∑
j=0
||v′j ||)2 (3)
The quadratic/arithmetic mean inequality yields:
1
m− 1
m−1∑
j=0
||v′j || ≤
√√√√ 1
m− 1
m−1∑
j=0
||v′j ||2
≤
√
n− g
m− 1 (4)
Combining Inequalities (3) and (4) yields the lemma. ✷
Next we remind the reader of an isomorphism from
quantum states to quantum operations, which in quan-
tum information theory dates back to the work of Jami-
olkowski [12] and Choi [10]. The correspondence was
subsequently reviewed and taken further in [3], where
Proposition 2 appears. First we relate vectors of Cm⊗Cn
to endomorphisms from Cn to Cm.
Isomorphism 1 The following linear map
ˆ : Cm ⊗ Cn → End(Cn → Cm)
A 7→ Aˆ∑
ij
Aij |i〉|j〉 7→
∑
ij
Aij |i〉〈j|
where i = 1, . . . ,m and j = 1, . . . , n, is an isomorphism
taking mn vectors A into m× n matrices Aˆ.
Second we relate elements ofMmn(C) to linear maps from
Mn(C) to Mm(C).
3Isomorphism 2 The following linear map:
̂ : Cmn ⊗ (Cmn)† −→ End(Mn(C)→Mm(C))
$ 7−→ [$̂ : ρ 7→ $̂(ρ)]
such that AB† 7−→ [ρ 7→ AˆρBˆ†] i.e.∑
ijkl
AijB
∗
kl|i〉|j〉〈k|〈l| 7−→ [ρ 7→
∑
ijkl
AijB
∗
kl|i〉〈j|ρ|l〉〈k| ]
where i, k = 1, . . . ,m and j, l = 1, . . . , n, is an isomor-
phism.
Definition 1 A linear map Ω : Mm(C) → Mn(C) is
Completely Positive-preserving if and only if for all r
and for all ρ in Herm+mr(C), (Ω ⊗ Idr)(ρ) belongs to
Herm+nr(C).
Completely Positive-preserving linear maps from quan-
tum states in Herm+n (C) to quantum states in Herm
+
m(C)
are exactly those which are physically allowable. They
correspond, via Isomorphism 2, to quantum states in
Herm+mn(C):
Theorem 1 [10] The linear operation $̂ : Mn(C) →
Mm(C) is Completely Positive-preserving if and only if
$ belongs to Herm+mn(C).
Definition 2 A linear map $̂ : Mn(C) → Mm(C) is
Trace-preserving if and only if for all ρ in Mn(C),
Tr($̂(ρ)) = Tr(ρ).
Completely Positive-preserving linear maps having unit
probability of occurrence on every input quantum state
are exactly those which are Trace-preserving. They
correspond, via Isomorphism 2, to quantum states in
Herm+mn(C) verifying
Tr1($) = Idn. (5)
Proposition 2 (State-operator formulae) [3] Let $̂
a linear map from Mn(C) to Mm(C), σ, ρ two elements
of Mn(C), κ, τ two elements of Mm(C). Then we have:
κ$̂(ρσ)τ = Tr2
(
(κ⊗ ρt)$(τ ⊗ σt))
where Tr2 denotes the partial trace over the second system
Cn in Cm ⊗ Cn. In particular this implies that for all
ρ ∈Mn(C) and κ ∈Mm(C),
Tr
(
κ$̂(ρ)
)
= Tr
(
(κ⊗ ρt)$).
As with many quantum cryptographic problems our anal-
ysis will require a careful optimization of the fidelity in-
duced by a quantum operation $̂. By means of the above
formulae we shall be able to write the induced fidelity
as a linear functional upon $. This step is crucial to the
next section (Lemma 3).
III. PRELIMINARY CALCULATIONS
A. Information Gain
There exists several well-motivated methods with
which to quantify Eve’s information gain. The one we
shall adopt focuses on her ability to make a guess after
the measurement. Compared with Shannon’s mutual en-
tropy this measure is advantageously close in nature to
the notion of disturbance.
Definition 3 (Mean estimation fidelity) The mean
estimation fidelity of a generalized measurement {Aˆr}
with guesses {|ψr〉} w.r.t to an ensemble {(pi, |φi〉〈φi|)}
is defined by:
G =
∑
r,i
p(r, i)|〈φi|ψr〉|2
=
∑
r,i
pi〈φi|Aˆ†rAˆr|φi〉Tr(|φi〉〈φi|ψr〉〈ψr|)
The mean estimation fidelity is to be understood as the
average fidelity between the measurer’s guess knowing
outcome r occurred (the |ψr〉’s) and the ith state which
was indeed originally sent to him (the |φi〉’s).
Notice it is justified to consider that Eve’s preferred at-
tack is a generalized measurement. In general she could
perform a quantum operation, which leaves her the possi-
bility to regroup several measurement outcomes into one
likelier outcome. But there is no information to be gained
by ignoring the break-up of the likelier measurement out-
come. In fact this would simply force some of the |ψr〉’s
to be equal: the induced disturbance can only be made
worse.
In our scenario Eve gathers information about the canon-
ical ensemble {(1/n, |j〉〈j|)}j=1..n, for which one obtains
G =
1
n
∑
r
Tr
(〈j|Aˆ†rAˆr|j〉 |j〉〈j|ψr〉〈ψr |)
Clearly Eve’s optimal guess knowing outcome r occurred
is |j(r)〉 such that 〈j(r)|Aˆ†rAˆr |j(r)〉 = maxj〈j|Aˆ†rAˆr|j〉.
As a consequence
G =
1
n
∑
r
〈j(r)|Aˆ†rAˆr|j(r)〉
=
1
n
∑
r
Tr
(
Aˆr|j(r)〉〈j(r)|Aˆ†r
)
=
1
n
∑
r
Tr
(
Id⊗|j(r)〉〈j(r)|ArA†r
)
where we applied Proposition 2. This yields:
Lemma 1 (Estimation as a linear functional) Let
$̂ ≡ {Aˆr} be a generalized measurements with best guess
|j(r)〉, and $ ≡ {Ar} its corresponding quantum state.
Further let
AC =
1
n
∑
r
Id⊗|j(r)〉〈j(r)|⊗|r〉〈r|
4With j(r) such that 〈j(r)|Aˆ†rAˆr|j(r)〉 = maxj〈j|Aˆ†rAˆr|j〉.
Then the mean estimation fidelity of $̂ with respect to the
canonical ensemble is given by
G =
∑
r
Tr
(
AC (Ar⊗|r〉)(Ar⊗|r〉)†
)
. (6)
As we have seen the generalized measurement is equiv-
alently described, using Isomorphism 1, by {Ar}, a set
of non-zero non-normalized n2-dimensional vectors. Fur-
ther consider the larger vector v = (Aijr)ijr , i.e. with r
itself an index of the complex components. The trace-
preserving condition upon the generalized measurement
is easily seen to imply that ||v||2 should be equal to n.
From Lemma 1 it is clear that when seeking an upper
bound for G under this fixed norm constraint, we may
assume v to take the form v = (Ajjr)jjr , because of the
identity matrix on the first subsystem of AC. As we shall
explain in subsection III B this can be done at no cost
for the mean induced fidelity. This way we reach the
following Lemma:
Lemma 2 (Information) Consider a generalized mea-
surement {Aˆr},
∑
r Aˆ
†
rAˆr = Id, Aˆr diagonal for all r,
acting upon an n-dimensional system. Then the mean
estimation fidelity w.r.t the canonical ensemble verifies
G ≤ 1
n
g
with g =
∑
r |Aj(r)j(r)r|2 and j(r) such that |Aj(r)j(r)r|2 =
maxj |Ajjr |2.
B. Disturbance
The notion of disturbance refers to Bob’s chances of
detecting Eve’s alteration of the state originally sent. For
this purpose Bob can, at best, project the received state
upon the span of the original state. Thus the disturbance
verifies D = 1− F , where F is the induced fidelity.
Definition 4 (Induced fidelity) The fidelity in-
duced by a quantum operation $̂ upon an ensemble
{(pi, |φi〉〈φi|)} is defined by:
F =
∑
i
piTr(|φi〉〈φi|$̂(|φi〉〈φi|))
The induced fidelity is to be understood as the average fi-
delity between the output of the quantum operation (the
$̂(|φi〉〈φi|)’s) and its input (the |φi〉〈φi|’s). A straightfor-
ward application of Proposition 2 yields: (with ∗ denot-
ing componentwise complex conjugation as usual)
F =
∑
i
piTr
((|φi〉〈φi|⊗|φ∗i 〉〈φ∗i |)$) (7)
In our scenario Eve is tested on the pairing ensemble
{(1/n2, ρjk}j,k=1...n, with ρjk = (|j〉+i|k〉)(〈j|−i〈k|)2 , for
which one obtains:
4 ρjk⊗ρ∗jk = |jj〉〈jj|+ |jj〉〈kk|+ i|jj〉〈jk| − i|jj〉〈kj|
+ |kk〉〈jj|+ |kk〉〈kk|+ i|kk〉〈jk| − i|kk〉〈kj|
− i|jk〉〈jj| − i|jk〉〈kk|+ |jk〉〈jk| − |jk〉〈kj|
+ i|kj〉〈jj|+ i|kj〉〈kk| − |kj〉〈jk|+ |kj〉〈kj|
ρjk⊗ρ∗jk + ρkj⊗ρ∗kj =
1
2
(|jj〉+ |kk〉)(〈jj|+ 〈kk|)
+
1
2
(|jk〉 − |kj〉)(〈jk| − 〈kj|)∑
jk
ρjk⊗ρ∗jk= (8)
1
4
∑
jk
((|jj〉+|kk〉)(〈jj|+〈kk|)+(|jk〉−|kj〉)(〈jk|−〈kj|))
We now proceed to express Equation (8) in terms of pro-
jectors. Regarding the subspace of repeated indices we
observe that:∑
jk
(|jj〉+|kk〉)(〈jj|+〈kk|) = 2∑
jk
(|jj〉〈jj|+ |jj〉〈kk|)
= 2n
∑
j
|jj〉〈jj|+ 2(∑
j
|jj〉)(∑
j
〈jj|)
As regards the subspace of non-repeated indices the vec-
tors |jk〉 − |kj〉 are already orthogonal to each other, so
long as we maintain j < k. Combining our newly found
spectral decomposition with Equation (7) yields:
Lemma 3 (Fidelity as a linear functional) Let $̂ be
a quantum operation, and $ its corresponding quantum
state.
Further let
£ =
1
2n
Prep +
1
2n
PβPrep
+
1
n2
∑
j<k
( |jk〉 − |kj〉√
2
)( 〈jk| − 〈kj|√
2
)
Pnonrep
With Prep =
∑
j
|j〉〈j| ⊗ |j〉〈j| Pnonrep = Id−Prep
|β〉 = 1√
n
∑
j
|jj〉 and Pβ = |β〉〈β|
Then the fidelity induced by $̂ upon the pairing ensemble
is given by
F = Tr(£ $). (9)
Using Theorem 1 $ is positive and may be thus be written
$ =
∑
ArA
†
r , with {Ar} a set of non-zero non-normalized
n2-dimensional vectors. Further consider the larger vec-
tor v = (Aijr)ijr . The trace-preserving condition upon
$̂ is easily seen to imply, via by Equation (5), that ||v||2
5should be equal to n. From Lemma 3 it is clear that,
when seeking an upper bound for F under this fixed norm
constraint and if n ≥ 2, we may assume v to lie in the
subspace of projector Prep ⊗ Id. In other words v takes
the form v = (Ajjr)jjr . As we have explained in sub-
section III A this can be done at no cost for the mean
estimation fidelity. We then have, using Lemma 3 still:
F =
1
2n
∑
ir
|Ajjr |2 + 1
2n2
∑
jkr
AjjrA
∗
kkr
This way we reach the following Lemma:
Lemma 4 (Disturbance) Consider a generalized mea-
surement {Aˆr},
∑
r Aˆ
†
rAˆr = Id, Aˆr diagonal for all r,
acting upon an n-dimensional system. Then the distur-
bance induced upon the pairing ensemble verifies
D ≥ 1
2
− 1
2n2
f
with f =
∑
r |
∑n−1
j=0 Ajjr |2.
IV. OPTIMIZATION AND CONCLUSION
We are now set to prove Claim 1. From Proposition 1
we immediately have
1
2
− 1
2n2
f ≥ 1
2
− 1
2n2
(√
g +
√
(n− 1)(n− g))2.
Applying Lemma 2 and 4 yields
D ≥ 1
2
− 1
2n2
(√
nG+
√
n(n− 1)(1−G))2
which in turn is nothing but Inequality (2). A plot of
the curve is shown in the Figure below. As was the case
with the continuous uniform ensemble[5] the generalized
measurement family
{Aˆr}, Aˆr =
√
G|r〉〈r| +
√
1−G
n− 1
(
Id− |r〉〈r|)
FIG. 1: Information Gain versus Disturbance.
In grey n = 4, in black n = 50.
saturates the tradeoff for any fixed G = 1/n .. 1. This
may come as no surprise since the corresponding n2 vec-
tors Ar verify
Ar = λ|rr〉 + µ|β〉, λ=
√
G−
√
1−G
n− 1 µ=
√
1−G
n− 1 .
In other words these unit vectors {Ar} can be thought
of as superpositions of Eve’s two extreme attacks: on
the one hand λ = 1 yields the projective measurement
{|r〉〈r|} maximizing the mean estimation fidelity, whilst
on the other hand µ = 1 yields the ‘do nothing’ mea-
surement {Id} minimizing the disturbance. Viewed from
the perspective of Lemma 3 Eve, as she seeks to be more
conservative, increases her component in the subspace of
Pβ .
The generalized measurement family ‘measure {|r〉〈r|}
with probability p else leave it alone’ does not saturate
the tradeoff, but linear combinations of pure states cor-
responding to measurement elements do. Stated in this
simple manner, our result suggests the state-operator
correspondence method developed in this paper could
establish itself as a very natural procedure for deriving
quantum cryptographic security bounds in general.
Finally we wish to point out that cryptographic ap-
plications of quantum decoys have recently been investi-
gated. An asymmetric variant of secure computation,
whereby Alice gets Bob to compute some well-known
function f upon her input x, but wants to prevent Bob
from learning anything about x, makes crucial use of the
artefact for its security [4].
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